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tions of much of modern industry combine to make men prefer to sham illness rather than go to work. But the positive gain in the increased happiness of children would outweigh the minus reaction of much deception, and, as health spreads, the hope and courage that normally go with it would prove as infectious as the disease and hopelessness of the slums and the callous fatalism of the Highlands and Islands.

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ETHICS AND LANGUAGE.

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THE human psyche manifests itself outwardly in speech, in myth and legend, in handicrafts and in customs. Among the races which have made some advance from the most primitive stage, language becomes literature, myth and legend become religion, handicrafts are developed into arts, and customs into statute law. In the higher stages we find these manifestations still further developed. Literature and the handicrafts are joined in the production of instrumental music, myth and legend not only become religion but grow into a more or less elaborate cult, the handicrafts eventually produce works of art in sculpture, in painting, and in architecture, while customs are not only fixed by statute, but generate moral sentiments which rise above law and are obeyed even when there is no constraint. We are here concerned only with the relation of languages to ethics, and shall not pursue the interrelation of other phases of mental activity that have produced what we call civilization.¹

¹ English unfortunately lacks a number of words, existing in German and other European languages, that express definite concepts in this domain of research. For example, we have no exact equivalent for the German *Kultur*, nor for *Kultus* (French, *le culte*), nor for *Sitte*, nor for *Wissenschaft*.

It must be evident to every one who has reflected upon the genesis and growth of moral concepts, that we have no means by which to trace them except the intensive study of the terms by which they are expressed. Not much light can be got from the languages older than the Greek. Egypt and Mesopotamia had attained a fairly high degree of civilization. Their citizens must therefore have practised rules recognizing the claims of one individual upon another: in other words, there must have been a fairly definite recognition of reciprocal duties and obligations. But our information is of the most vague character. Even where we have before us a written code, we have no means of knowing to what extent it was observed and enforced. Why the ancient civilization in these regions persisted as long as it did and then perished completely, will probably always remain an unsolved enigma. When we come to a study of Hebrew we are upon somewhat firmer ground. Albeit, this language does not take us further back than the Homeric poems. Besides, the Jews did not investigate their language with the same assiduity as did the Greeks; consequently we are not in position to penetrate as deeply into its arcana. Neither is the Hebrew a primitive language in the sense in which the Greek is primitive.

It is illuminating for the growth of moral ideas that the Homeric poems contain a number of terms that have, in some cases, a slightly ethical tinge. We are here on the threshold of ethical ideas. But there is not one of which the meaning is unambiguous and definite. Buchholz, in his "*Homerische Realien*," devotes about one hundred and sixty-five pages to the consideration of Homeric ethics. His conclusion is that there is very little in the conduct of the Homeric characters that can be called ethical, and that there are no words which express clear-cut ethical ideas. Homer's men are estimated by their peers almost entirely according to their prowess, or their physical efficiency. Those who do things or get things done, no matter by what means, are represented as the favorites of the gods. An illuminating passage is found

in the thirteenth Book of the "Odyssey." It purports to give the words of Athene to her favorite:

Crafty must he be, and knavish, who would outdo thee in all manner of guile, even if it were a god encountered thee. Hardy man, subtle of wit, of guile insatiate, so thou wast not . . . to cease from thy sleights and knavish words, which thou lovest from the bottom of thy heart. But come, no more let us tell of these things, being both of us practised in deceits, for that thou art of all men far the first in counsel and in discourse, and I in the company of all the gods win renown for my wit and wile.

This translation of Messrs. Lang, Leaf, and Myers in poetic prose is probably as near an accurate rendering into English as can be made. But we are liable to be misled by its archaisms and by the definite meaning we are wont to attach to some of the words. We get the poetry of the original rather than its full meaning. Here the poet places the man and the goddess on the same moral level, and an extremely low level it is. It is within bounds to say that such a man would have no standing in reputable society. Yet the "Odyssey" already represents an advance over the "Iliad" in notions of right and wrong. It does not quite so much glorify slaughter and brute force; it shows a slight preference for the cunning man over the man whose chief glory is physical prowess. Although the nobler impulses do not appear frequently in either of the poems, they come to the surface occasionally. There are more words in the later poem that by implication betray ethical feeling, albeit somewhat vaguely. Among them are 'god-fearing' (*theoudēs*), 'right-minded' (*noēmōn*), 'just' (*dikaïos*), and 'holy' (*hagnē*). None of these words occurs in the "Iliad." They have not the precision of meaning they attained later, but they mark the direction in which their subsequent development proceeded. Self-possession, fertility in resource, fortitude amid the most hopeless circumstances, nobility of birth, tenure of political power according to the narrow views of the age, insight and prudence, physical strength and beauty, attachment to friends and implacable hostility to enemies,—these are

the primary virtues of Homer's heroes. Some of them were endowed with more of these attributes; others with less. So many words are employed to express them that we readily see how vague the meaning of each one must have been and how they overlap more or less. We have here plainly a groping after something which the poet or poets felt, by a sort of instinct, must exist; yet the language of the age was lacking in the terms needed. The man who thinks clearly can generally express himself clearly and to the point, while he whose ideas are vague usually talks and talks without getting near the heart of the matter. This is what we find in Homer.

Walter Bagehot, although he did not have the Homeric age specifically in mind, has some lucid remarks to offer on primitive conditions, which are appropriate in this connection. He says:

I at least cannot call up to myself the loose conceptions (as they must have been) of morals which then existed. If we set aside all the elements derived from law and policy which run through our current moral notions, I hardly know what we shall have left. The residuum was somehow, and in some vague way, intelligible to the ante-political man, but it must have been uncertain, wavering, and unfit to be depended upon. In the best cases it existed much as the vague feeling of beauty exists in minds sensitive but untaught: a still small voice of uncertain meaning; an unknown something modifying everything else and higher than anything else, yet in form so indistinct that when you looked for it, it was gone,—or if this be thought the delicate fiction of a later fancy, then morality was at least to be found in the wild spasms of 'wild justice,' half punishment, half outrage,—but anyhow, being unmixed by steady law, it was intermittent, vague, and hard for us to imagine. . . . In these days, when we can not by any effort drive out of our minds the notion of law, we can not imagine the mind of one who could not by any effort have conceived it.²

The Homeric poet endeavors to place himself amid the scenes which he describes. He does not profess to be better than the men whose characters he portrays. We may, however, credit him with a little keener insight, a little closer sympathy with the moral virtues, a little more kindness of feeling than we may expect to find

² "Physics and Politics," *The Preliminary Age*, Sect. II.

among the rough and ready men of action whom he brings before us. Hence we find him now and then delaying his narrative, in order to expatiate on scenes and circumstances betokening a sympathy with the milder traits which were gradually developing among his countrymen. We may cite the parting of Hector and Andromache, the interview between the swineherd Eumæus and Ulysses, and the dire plight of the faithful hound Argos, which moved his master to tears. There are few more touching passages in all the range of poetry. When we compare his subsequent treatment of the suitors, it is hard for us to believe that the same man could be so tender and so truculent. Yet every one who reads knows that similar traits come into evidence almost every day. Mr. Bagehot says further:

To sum up, law, rigid, definite, concise law, is the primary want of early mankind. But it is their greatest difficulty, as well as their first requisite; the thing most out of their reach, as well as that most beneficial to them if they reach it. . . . The Romans did half the work for above half of Europe. But where could the first ages find Romans or a conqueror?³

The Greeks, even of the Homeric age, had regard for what we call law. But our language has no words to express the poet's meaning accurately. He says of the Cyclops, ἀθεμίστια ἦδη, that is, he had no regard for divine ordinances, although his noun is a negative. Further on we learn that he knew neither judgment nor justice: οὐτε δίκας εἶδόντα οὐτε θεμίστας. Here we have the positive counterpart of *athemistia* above. These 'themistes' were unwritten ordinances, which, from length of usage, had come to be regarded as sacred. The average Greek never learned to distinguish between moral conduct proper, conduct regulated by law, and conduct that follows custom. When we read that an act was performed *kata nomon*, we are often uncertain whether it was according to law or to usage. Moreover, the student of Greek affairs is constantly confronted with the faith which the

³ Same reference.

citizens had in law, and with their disregard of justice in the modern sense. The bane of the Athenians above all others was legislation and litigation. Everything had to be done according to law, even if a law enacted to-day had to be repealed to-morrow, or if a law had to be passed to suit a special case. Greek literature is filled with invectives against tyrants (or, as they had better be called, usurpers), no matter how benevolent and public spirited they might be, although the ecclesia was often guilty of the most flagrant acts of tyranny. The history of Athens is the record of an almost uninterrupted effort to create a moral sentiment by statute. Venality was the besetting sin of its citizens. In spite of the severe penalties imposed upon bribery and inflicted upon those who were found guilty of accepting bribes, the evil grew apace. The same mortal disease preyed upon the political vitals of Sparta, although its government was differently constituted. The failure to develop a sound ethnic and personal morality apart from law, ultimately led to the ruin of Greece. We find something of the same thing in Rome, but, for reasons that need not detain us here, the disease was slower in its operation. When the church eventually became the heir of the secular empire, its laws took the place of those of the state, until in the end what the hierarchy prescribed was regarded as the moral norm by almost everybody.

When we come to the Germanic nations, we find a different condition of affairs. *Sitte*, *Gesetz*, and *Satzung* were *Nomos* and *Nomoi*, but to act in conformity with them was not necessarily *sittlich*. Schiller makes the conspirators on the Ruetli appeal to the old *Satzungen* for their rights. Luther appealed from the church to the Scriptures, and by so doing paved the way for a personal morality, since his doctrine culminated in making every man the judge of his own actions in their ethical aspects. Feeble as the efforts were at first, the reformed church was based upon the right of private judgment. Says Hegel:

In the Lutheran church the subjective feeling and the conviction of the individual is regarded as equally necessary with the objective side of truth. Truth with the Lutherans is not a finished and completed thing; the subject himself must be imbued with truth, surrendering his particular being in exchange for the substantial Truth and making that Truth his own.⁴

The religious reformers, in a sense, took up the problem of morals where the Greek thinkers had left it, with the result that the inward monitors have developed more and more apart from and independent of the hierarchy. No Protestant can say that an act is *sittlich* because it is *Sitte*. It may therefore be confidently affirmed that modern ethics rests upon the firmest possible basis. If our present civilization should ever pass away, as did that of ancient times, it will not be from lack of knowledge, but from weakness of will to put knowledge into practice.

It is probable that we have access to only a part of the vocabulary in use in the time of Homer. Most of the later commentators, it is true, tell us that in those days all persons spoke alike. Modern analogies are against such an hypothesis. Homeric Greek is the speech of an aristocratic class. The wide range of its vocabulary, with its multiplicity of forms, notwithstanding the narrow intellectual outlook of its *dramatis personæ*, may be taken as evidence that it was not the speech of the thrall and the peasant. These were rarely or never admitted to the festive occasions when the poems were recited. If we may judge from the limited vocabulary employed by the illiterate in our day, the common man in Homer's time would not have comprehended one-third of the fifteen thousand words in the poems. We have here the language which incorporates the morals of the aristocracy. In the fragments that have come down to us under the name of Theognis, we begin to see the differentiation of moral concepts into what we may call a higher and a lower stratum. Some of these fragments are at least as old as the sixth century B. C. They furnish instructive

⁴“Philosophy of History,” Pt. IV, Sect. III, Sibree's translation.

testimony of the transformation which many words had commenced to undergo. The plebeians were laying claim to patrician virtues, although all our testimony comes from the latter class. The former were learning to use the ethical vocabulary of the optimates; but not in the received sense. Many terms which in the course of time came to be used almost exclusively in an ethical sense, were formerly employed in a social and political signification. Grote, in the third volume of his "History of Greece," calls attention to this feature of Greek in the time of Theognis, and adds some interesting parallels from the later Greek and from the Latin. He might have cited examples from any modern language. If we trace the history of the word 'gentleman,' we find that it has been gradually extending the scope of its meaning. In "John Halifax, Gentleman," it has reached the domain of the waif and the outcast. Lecky says: "In the province of Ulster, Archbishop Synge assures us, that there were not in his time more than forty dissenters of the rank of *gentlemen*." ⁵ Theognis would have written that there were not more than forty *kaloï kagathoi*. We can follow the course of this word in its different forms in the English and Romance languages back into the Latin. The gentleman is the man who belongs to a *gens*, and who has, therefore, a traceable ancestry. Our word 'noble' has gradually undergone a like amplification of meaning. A noble deed was originally one that was performed by a nobleman, or that was characteristic of the noble class, the nobility. The nobility was the judge. If the common man performed an act that excited admiration, it was simply because he did what a nobleman would have done. The world has, however, grown wiser by experience and has learned to distinguish between a noble man and a nobleman. The nobles and the notables are those who are known. Roman biographers sometimes inform us that So-and-So was born in an obscure place, that is,

⁵ "History of England," Vol. II, p. 437. American edition.

of obscure ancestry, in a class of society that was not known, a class that was careless about its progenitors. It was only by a sort of transferred merit that a menial could be credited with a noble deed: it was by doing as a nobleman would have done. We find exactly the same concept underlying the German. The *Edelmann* is the man who is a member of the *Adel*. *Eine edle Handlung* is one that is characteristic of the man who belongs to the *Adel*. The same root exists in the Anglo-Saxon; the Norman conquest, however, displaced it with a derivative from the Latin.⁶ Dr. Bloomfield, in his note on a passage in Thucydides, where the *kaloï kagathoi* are spoken of as the so-called respectable people, shows a singular misapprehension of the real state of the case. The qualifying epithet is not added because the appellation was not yet "firmly established," but for the opposite reason. It was the common designation. A similar passage is found in Plato's "Republic." Whether the aristocracy embraces the best people is usually a matter of locality, or at least of country. Rome was during almost its entire existence as a state governed by an aristocratic class. According to the standard of the time, it was generally well governed. Both German and French writers are wont to characterize the English government as the best in Europe and to point to it as a model. Yet, until quite recently, it was almost entirely in the hands of the aristocracy. While therefore the same statement may be made of almost every country of Europe, the subject fared worse everywhere than in Great Britain. It is not probable that *Herrenmoral* "fell into desuetude in Greece through the Socratic philosophy": this was due to ethical progress; Socrates merely gave it a fixed place in literary discussion by emphasizing the intrinsic worth of man as man. It is a matter of common knowledge that Xenophon and Plato, and, in a scarcely less degree, Aristotle had little sympathy for Demos.

⁶ We thus have *noble* for the Germanic *Adel* and *edel*.

The terms, 'gentle' and 'virtue,' when traced back to their original signification, show a transition almost from one pole to the other. Virtue was originally masculine excellence, as the etymology of the word plainly indicates. In its present sense it is used chiefly of woman: one does not often hear of a virtuous man. 'Gentle' and '*gentler*' are now applied only to the female sex. Although woman counted for very little legally until within recent times, she was accounted the bearer of the *gens*. While 'genteel' has not any necessary connection with morality, gentle as a component part of gentleman is often associated with moral characteristics. Lowell speaks of Roger Williams as being a "gentle and good man." We need not go back to Theognis to ascertain what is meant by 'good society.' Every village can furnish practical examples of persons who, in common parlance, move in 'good society' or in the 'best society.' What the adjective connotes depends upon local conditions: one thing is certain,—it is never applied to those who labor with their hands. The very persons who are excluded use the phrases that have gained currency among those who employ them in disparagement. Of course, the Outs do not mean exactly the same thing as the Ins. We have the fact repeated *ad nauseam*, when disclosures of municipal rottenness are made, that some of the 'best citizens' are implicated. Moreover, every penitentiary in this and every other country shelters a colony of those 'best citizens.'

It is to be noted that in the Homeric age public opinion, as we may call it, already exercised a very strong influence. Then as now it was usually in favor of morality, or at least of social order, but not always. This mysterious force, which everybody fears and for which nobody is responsible, plays an important part in every society no matter how loosely organized. It has led to the lynching of many an innocent victim and to the acquittal of many a proved criminal. It has sustained many a man in his fight against corruption, and has condemned many a

woman who was a sacrifice to man's perfidy. When not crystalized into statutes, any person is at liberty to discard it, while few have the courage to do so. Custom, which is but hereditary public opinion and differs from it only in that it changes slowly, while public opinion sometimes changes rapidly, is, according to Pindar, king of all. The Greeks, already in the time of Herodotus, had noted this, and had begun to distinguish between custom and nature. When Darius asked some Greeks for what they would be willing to eat the dead bodies of their parents, they cried out in horror that nothing could induce them to do so; when he called a tribe of Indians and asked what would induce them to burn the corpses of their parents, they were shocked at the bare thought of such a deed. The word chiefly used by Homer to designate public disapproval is *nemesis*, which was not yet a personification of retributive justice, a signification which it attained at a later period. Three other terms are likewise of frequent occurrence: *aidōs*, *aischos*, and *oneidos*. All are, however, regarded as deterrent and not hortatory. It may be remarked in this connection that law on the whole, whether moral or statutory, is chiefly prohibitory. Jurisprudence is mainly a system of restraints, except in so far as it embodies directions to the officers of administration. In the "Iliad" Phoinix says, when minded to slay his father: "Some immortal stayed mine anger, bringing to my mind the people's voice and all the reproaches of men (*oneidea*) lest I should be called a father-slayer amid the Achaians."⁷ This passage, albeit of doubtful authenticity, is thoroughly Homeric in spirit. In another passage Helen wishes "that she had been mated with a better man that felt dishonor and the multitude of men's reproachings (*Νέμεσιν τε καὶ αἰσχεα*)."⁸ Elsewhere Nestor beseeches the Achaians to "set shame of other men's contempt in your hearts (*αἰδῶ*)."⁸ In the

⁷ Bk. IX, l. 460.

⁸ Bk. XV, l. 661.

"Odyssey" Telemachus says: "My mother will call down dire avengers as she departs from the house, and I shall have the blame of men (*nemesis*)."⁹ In the twenty-second Book, Ulysses tells the wooers that they had no fear of the indignation of men hereafter (*nemesin*).¹⁰

Oneidos occurs eight times in the "Iliad" and three times in the "Odyssey." *Aischos* occurs four times in each of the poems. *Aidōs* is found twenty-five times in the two poems, and the verb from the same root more than forty times, while *nemesis* with its verb is met with equally often. There is also manifest a solicitude for the good opinion of posterity. Penelope says:

Man's life is brief enough. And if any be a hard man and hard at heart, all men cry evil on him for the time to come, while he yet lives, and all men mock him when he is dead. But if any be a blameless man and blameless at heart, his guests noise wide his fame abroad, and many call him excellent.¹¹

The potency of public opinion is further illustrated by an anecdote found in Herodotus.¹² He tells us that Pantites, who purposely or unavoidably stayed away from the combat at Thermopylæ, found himself in such disgrace that he hanged himself.

The regular Greek word for virtue is *aretē*. But it includes a great many kinds of excellence; moral excellence hardly at all. When the spirit of Agamemnon meets Ulysses in Hades, he felicitates him on the devotion of his wife and exclaims: "Happy son of Laertes, in good sooth, with great steadfastness (*aretē*) thou didst win thy wife."¹³ And a few lines farther on: "Therefore the glory of her fidelity (*aretē*) shall never perish, and the immortals shall make a precious song in the ears of men to the fame of constant Penelope." The term occurs nearly twenty times in the "Odyssey" and in the "Iliad"

⁹ Bk. II, l. 136.

¹⁰ L. 40.

¹¹ Od. XIX, l. 329.

¹² Bk. VII, Ch. 232.

¹³ Od. Bk. XXIV, l. 193.

about half as often. Evidently the dominant motive was prudence, the desire to stand well with the members of the narrow circle to which the speaker belonged. This motive is surprisingly modern. It hardly needs to be mentioned that, in the long process of evolution, only here and there a man has been evolved whose actions and conduct are not greatly influenced by a narrower or wider public opinion, but solely by convictions. We must infer then that institutions, religious, political, and social, had to become in some measure fixed, before conduct was developed that involved at least the germs of morality, that is, conduct that had no regard to the opinion of others. It is probable that the notion of free agency was entirely foreign to the Homeric age. Man was the puppet of what Hegel calls the objective will, this intangible force that tosses him about in every direction, as the waves toss a frail bark on the ocean. This being the case, we cannot speak of ethical conduct in the proper sense of the term. There is probably not a single instance mentioned in either the "Iliad" or the "Odyssey," where a reason is given for an act, which is not attributed to some supernatural agency and therefore to an agency that is purely external. Even the word that may sometimes be translated 'to think,' means, rather, 'to say to one's self.' What a primitive stage this represents, and that all men at one time occupied the same stage, may be gleaned from a statement I read not long ago, in which the writer asserted that in one of the South African languages he found that the verb 'to think' really meant 'to talk in one's belly.'

The usual term for good is *agathos*. It is met with more than a hundred times in Homer, while its superlative is of still more frequent occurrence. Both words occur more frequently in the "Iliad" than in the "Odyssey," owing to the larger number of characters the former poem brings upon the scene of action, although, it may be remarked in passing, the feminine form is used twice as often in the later as in the earlier epic. When we speak of a 'good man,' nobody is in doubt as to what

we mean; the good man in Homer is, however, his antipode in almost every respect. The man who was endowed with the largest measure of *aretē* was *agathos*. This *aretē* was *Tugend* in German and *virtus* in Latin. *Tugend* is clearly related to *taugen*, a verb of frequent use. (The *Taugenichts* is the ne'er-do-weel.) It was primarily applied to persons, with reference to the vigor that is characteristic of the prime of life. But its application in a literature is far wider: it is used of horses, of wine, of a sword, and so forth. Goethe speaks of *die Tugenden natürlicher Edelsteine*. English writers, until comparatively recent times, employed 'virtues' in the same sense. A thousand years after Homer, *aretē* still had a slight tinge of objectivity. Both in Plutarch and in the New Testament it is correlated with *doxa* and *epainos*, as we may see in the passage: "If there be any virtue," etc. (Philippians, iv, 8).

Let us examine the Latin a little farther. When Horace¹⁴ writes: "Virtus, repulsæ nescia sordidæ," etc., Virtue that knows not the disgrace of defeat; and again: "Virtus recludens immeritis mori Cœlum," Virtue opening heaven wide to those who deserve not to die; he had in mind the modern conception of virtue as moral excellence. A little farther along, when glorifying the man who is bold in conscious worth, he informs us that it was by this course, that is, by virtue, that Pollux and roving Hercules and father Bacchus and Augustus and Quirinus gained the fiery heights. Here are two conceptions of virtue which present a singular mixture. To speak of it as one of the qualities that distinguished Hercules and Bacchus seems like a parody. We can suppress a smile only when we recall what the word meant to the author; for the context shows that he was in earnest. In modern Italy the etymological descendant of *virtus* appears in a still different garb. Dryden says: "The Italians call

¹⁴ Odes, III, 2. The three Odes beginning the Third Book are really but one.

a man a *virtuoso* who loves the noble arts and is a critic in them." Here the virtuous man, conformably to the national predilection for the fine arts, is he who possesses expert knowledge or skill. It is true, even in Italy this is not the sole meaning of virtuous, but it is the one that most impressed foreigners, and hence was transferred by them into their own tongue.

Bonus means *agathos*. In Latin discussion it appears most frequently in the phrase *summum bonum*. Its earliest use shows a strongly materialistic tinge; nor are its descendants and equivalents free from it. *Bona* meant the good things of this life, earthly possessions, a signification that is almost exactly covered by the French *biens*. In *hommes de bien* we still have the word, but the connection shows that its meaning has shifted. The German *Gut* is likewise a familiar designation of landed property, an estate. In the English 'goods' the word has a purely material signification. A careful examination of *honestus* makes it evident that if it ever meant 'honorable' or 'honest' in their subjective sense, the instances are rare and late compared with those in which it means honorable, that is, honored with a public office. Its Latin congeners have all more or less regard to outward appearance. In a state of society in which the good of the tribe was of prime importance, to be entrusted with an office, through which its interests could be most effectively guarded, was the highest mark of esteem. *Honor* and *honors* refer entirely to official dignities. Closely akin in meaning is the German *Ehre*, rank, dignity, magnificence, although its related root in the Anglo-Saxon has not passed into English. *Der Ehrwürdige* is covered by our 'honorable,' when applied as an official title; but it does not mean *der Ehrliche* any more than our 'honorable' means honest or upright. An honorable man is just as much the noblest work of God as an honest man; to be an 'Honorable' is something quite different. Evidently Mark Anthony, in the speech Shakespeare puts into his mouth, regarded the two terms as synonymous.

One of the most important vocables that may be considered in this connection is 'conscience.' It is usually defined as that power or faculty of the human mind by which it discerns the moral quality of acts and feelings. But the Latin word *conscientia* by no means covers our word conscience, although it is its direct ancestor. It is plainly connected with cognition (*con-scientia*), and means a knowing along with something else, or perhaps with ourselves. The Greek *syneidesis* is compounded in precisely the same way. In speaking of conscience, a competent authority says: "Neither Greek nor Roman used it in our sense. It is unknown to the Old Testament, is never used by our Lord, nor by the New Testament writers except Paul and Peter."¹⁵ This statement is perhaps a little stronger than the facts warrant, but there is no doubt that it is true in the main. As late as the time of Luther, the terms *wissen* (know) and *Gewissen* were sometimes employed as synonyms. In German a distinction has likewise arisen between *das Recht* and *das Rechte*, just as in English we make a difference between right and rights. It is well known that under the law a man may have rights that are clearly in contravention of right. Legal rights differ widely in different countries and in the same country at different times. Again, *rechtschaffen* means made or created according to what is right. It is *rechtgeschaffen*. *Der rechtschaffene Mann* was primarily the man who lived according to the right, as established by the community of which he formed a part. It has now risen to a higher plane. Here we come upon the straight man, the upright man, a being created by the human imagination and placed in a region where he still dwells, but towards which the hopes and aspirations and strivings of man are advancing by imperceptible gradations. The straight man, the upright man, the righteous man, is the highest type of the human species as pictured in speech by the consensus of the com-

¹⁵ See Thayer's Lexicon of N. T. Greek.

munity. But the underlying concept is purely materialistic. It has long been the fashion to talk glibly of 'rights' as if it were a term concerning the signification of which there could be no dispute. Men in general think, if they do not say, that 'all men are endowed with certain inalienable rights.' In practice these assumed inalienable rights are constantly alienated and circumscribed by the state. They must be defined before they can be defended; and definition is limitation.

A few words as to 'manners' and its etymological relations will not be out of place here. When the English translators wrote: "Evil communications corrupt good manners," they meant morals. Luther's German says: "*Boese Geschwaetze verderben gute Sitten.*" The Greek evidently means that evil associations corrupt good morals, a point which the English of three centuries ago does not bring out. When Cicero exclaimed: "*O tempora, O mores,*" he was calling attention to the perverted manners and morals of his day, but his hearers had to infer his meaning. 'Manners' no longer has any connection with morals; it is applied only to behavior. Hence a man may have bad manners and be thoroughly upright. The term is used several times in the Bible, while morals does not occur. The French progenitor of 'manners' is of frequent occurrence; from the French it passed into both German and English with scarcely a change of meaning. *Moral* is of late appearance in German; it seems to have been borrowed from the French by Wolff, for the purpose of avoiding the ambiguity to which *Sitte* might lead. The same ambiguity lurks in *Sittlichkeit*: hence the Germans often use *Moralität*, as morality of the heart, or conscience, and *Sittlichkeit*, as conventional moral conduct. Neither 'ethics' nor 'morals' seems to occur in Shakespeare, but he uses 'manners' a number of times to designate conduct. It is probable that the former of these words at least, was not naturalized in English until after his time.

There is a considerable number of other words that

exhibit the growth of humaneness and even common honesty by the gradual strengthening of the objective will. The process was probably about as follows: Ten men, or any number, may be equally heartless; but under special provocation one of them makes himself guilty of an atrocious act. The indignation, or at least the disapproval, of the other nine who have not been under similar temptation is aroused and in one way and another the culprit is made to feel its effects. Under a legally organized government this indignation usually finds expression in a prohibitory statute. Such has often been the case. Corporate honesty, in the large sense, is often promoted by a flagrant breach of trust; the financial loss of a few becomes a safeguard for many in the future. Penalties for crimes are never imposed upon abstract principles, but only after specific acts.

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